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Abstract 
This paper first briefly reviews the worldwide development of the size of the university sector, 
its research merits and authorities’ use of incentive systems for its academic staff. Then, the 
paper develops a static model of a researcher’s behaviour, aiming to discuss how different 
salary reward schemes and teaching obligations influence his or her research merits. Moreover, 
special focus is placed on discussing the importance of the researcher’s skills and of working 
in solid academic environments for quality research. The main findings are as follows: First, 
research achievements will improve irrespective of the relative impact quantity and quality of 
research have on researchers’ salaries. Second, small changes in fixed salary and teaching duties 
will not influence the amount of time academics spend on research and, as such, their research 
merits. Third, because research productivity, i.e. the number of pages written and research 
quality increase with the researcher’s skills and effort, both these figures signal a researcher’s 
potential when adjusting for his or her age and the kind of research carried out.  Finally, because 
researchers’ utility depends on factors beyond salary and leisure time, employers have a number 
of instruments to use in order to attract skilled researchers in a globalised market.  
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1. Introduction 
Human capital has a central role in determining the wealth of nations (Manuelli and Seshadri, 
2014). Part of the reason for this is that individuals with more or higher-quality human capital 
achieve a higher performance (Dimov and Shepherd, 2005) and produce higher-quality goods 
(Stokey, 1991). One of the most important investments to be made in human capital is education 
(Becker, 1964), and cross-country studies have found a strong correlation between per capita 
output and the average number of years spent at school (Mankiw et al., 1992). It is therefore 
not surprising that investing in the higher education system is vital for future economic growth 
(Browne et al., 2010).  
 
During the 20th century higher education expanded tremendously. It is estimated that 
approximately half a million students were enrolled at higher education institutions in the year 
1900 (see Schofer and Meyer, 2005). In the 1960s, the rate at which the student numbers 
increased began accelerating (Lorenz, 2012). In 1970, the number of students at higher 
education institutions had reached 2.5 million; in 2000, there were 100 million students; and in 
2010, there were 178 million students (Tremblay et al., 2012).  
 
Along with the growth in enrolment rate, both the number of academic staff at higher education 
institutions and the resources (i.e. money) spent on the sector has increased. From 2000 to 2010, 
for example, the expenditure on tertiary educational institutions in the OECD increased by 48% 
and the number of students by 33% (OECD, 2014a); consequently, expenditure per student 
increased by 14%. During the same 10-year period, the number of researchers in the OECD 
grew by 33%, from 3.1 million to 4.2 million (OECD, 2014b). 
 
Not only has the number of students and staff increased during the last decade, research output 
has risen as well. The first scientific articles were published in 1665 (Brown, 1972) and, 
approximately 350 years later, the total number of published scientific articles has exceeded 50 
million (Jinha, 2010). This number is likely to double to more than 100 million articles in the 
next 24 years if the former annual growth rate of 3% continues (Ware, 2006).  
 
The introduction of incentive and reward systems, more qualified academic staff, increased 
research collaboration and improved research conditions have been said to explain the growth 
in research productivity observed in the last few decades (Kyvik and Aksnes, 2015).  Moreover, 
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because both researchers and research departments are evaluated based on their publication rate 
(see e.g. Dries et al., 2008, Stremersch et al., 2007), all parties have strong incentives to publish. 
However, studies have found that only 1% of the researchers publish in scientific journals every 
year (Ioannidis et al., 2014) and that 50% of all publications are produced by 10% of academics 
(Kwiek, 2015). This suggests that there is unused potential for increasing global research 
output. Consequently, knowledge about how researchers’ behaviour can be affected is 
important in order for the institutions, and policymakers, to implement schemes that can lead 
to increased research output. 
 
The aim of this paper is, therefore, to present a model that describes a researcher’s behaviour. 
This model forms the basis for discussing how actual research policy measures, such as reward 
schemes for university academics and their teaching and administrative obligations, influence 
their research effort and achievements. Consequently, effective measures to increase research 
output are identified. Moreover, the importance of researchers’ skills and working environment 
for quality research are analysed. Because approximately one-third of total research man-years 
in the EU countries are conducted by staff at universities (Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2015), 
their research conditions are important for countries’ research output. 
 
Earlier articles addressing the behaviour of researchers theoretically and empirically include 
Levin and Stephan (1991) and Jung (2014). The former focuses, in particular, on how the 
number of articles published in scientific journals varies with the researchers’ age. The latter 
addresses similar issues in the sense that it discusses how research productivity changes by 
career stage and academic discipline. In addition, it attempts to identify factors influencing 
research productivity and how the same factors vary through researchers’ careers. Neither of 
these two works, however, provide as detailed a description of researchers’ behaviour as this 
article. This makes our work more suitable to discuss the influence of many different research 
policy measures.   
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the development of 
incentive research schemes at universities. Then, in Section 3, we develop a general static model 
of a researcher’s behaviour with thorough discussion and interpretation of the functions used 
and the optimal solutions. To formulate tractable mathematical solutions and derive more exact 
results, we specify the actual functions of the model more precisely in Section 4 and comment 
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on the results. Finally, the most interesting conclusions, policy implications and weaknesses of 
the article are summarised in Section 5. 
 
2. The development of incentive research schemes towards universities 
New public management (NPM) spread in the 1980s as a means to make the public sector 
efficient and transparent, and thus accountable (Lorenz, 2012). NPM provides a set of practical 
control technologies through which policies and their instrumentation can be translated into 
practices that change structures, processes and behaviours on the ground (Enders and 
Westerheijden, 2014). Although institutional autonomy and academic freedom are fundamental 
values in higher education (Bleiklie, 1998), NPM has been the guiding governance model of 
university reforms in Europe for the last 20 years (Hüther and Krücken, 2013).  
 
The introduction of NPM to the higher education sector has led to an increased emphasis on 
performance (Tolofari, 2005), using, for example, performance-based university research 
funding systems, or PRFS (see e.g. Hicks, 2012, Schubert, 2009). Research output is one of the 
parameters by which the institutions in the sector can be measured, and as a result, an effort has 
been made to develop good publication indicators. 
 
Broadly speaking, there are three main groups of PRFS. These are the panel-based model, the 
citation-based model and the publication-based model (Aagaard et al., 2014), each of which 
have their benefits and disadvantages. The panel-based model implies that a panel of the 
university staff is appointed and given the task of conducting a peer review. The citation-based 
model addresses the degree to which the research produced is cited by fellow researchers.1 
Finally, the publication-based model evaluates the number of articles published. As such, the 
first is a peer-review evaluation method and the last two are bibliometric evaluation methods.  
 
The first countries to introduce PRFS were the United Kingdom, in 1986, and Spain, in 1989 
(Hicks, 2012). In 1990, Australia launched its own PRFS based on a bibliometric evaluation of 
the employees at the nation’s higher education institutions (Aagaard et al., 2014). In the 
Australian system, all publications are counted equally, irrespective of the impact of the journal 
in which they were published. As a result, most of the increase in the number of research articles 
published annually came through low-impact journals (Butler, 2004).  
                                                 
1 In Hanssen and Jørgensen (2014), Hanssen and Jørgensen (2015) and Hanssen et al. (2018), a researcher’s 
skills are measured by the number of times his works are cited. 
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Later, countries such as Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands also 
introduced performance-based research indicators to their research funding (Hægeland et al., 
2014). However, these countries have all designed their PRFS slightly differently. In Sweden, 
20% of the research funding is allocated based on how the institutions perform with regard to 
the number of publications, the number of citations and external research funding. In Finland, 
the solidity of the universities’ research departments is based on the number of completed PhDs, 
scientific publications, external research funding, the number of completed PhDs by foreign 
students and the number of foreign staff. Denmark allocates research funds to universities based 
on the number of students who finish their studies within a predetermined time frame, the 
amount of external research funding they attract, scientific publications and the number of 
completed PhDs. The Norwegian system also takes into account the number of completed 
PhDs, research funding from The Research Council of Norway and research funding from the 
European Union (Hægeland et al., 2014). Based primarily on the experiences of Australia, 
Norway also opted for a system in which scientific publications were classified into two levels 
to promote publication in channels with high impact (Aagaard et al., 2014). Total research 
output (publication points) is thus a weighted sum of the number of articles published, using 
their scientific level as weights. Finally, the research component of the base funding of 
institutions in the Netherlands is based on the number of PhDs (and a particular degree in 
technology), research schools and a historical component.   
 
This brief review of these five countries’ PFRS suggests that the number of completed PhDs is 
considered an important research indicator, as they all use this metric in their funding system. 
It is also worth noting that the Netherlands does not use bibliometric assessments when 
allocating funds to universities.  
 
Although the stated objective of introducing the PFRS is to redistribute resources based on the 
resulting performance of the institutions, the redistributional effect is often limited (Hægeland 
et al., 2014). However, because the fixed costs are often large for most research institutions, 
this is a good thing, as large annual fluctuations in funding can cause institutions to go bankrupt 
(Hicks, 2012). Nevertheless, implementing research funding systems that reward institutions 
with good results tends to improve the results of the sector and lead to higher research 
productivity. In Norway, for example, the incentive system has resulted in increasing 
publication frequency, due to both a large increase in the share of researchers with publication 
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activity and an increase in the average publication activity among publishing researchers. The 
quality of research has become neither better nor worse (Aagaard et al., 2014).  
 
3. A static model for a researcher’s behaviour 
To discuss a researcher’s behaviour and research merits we introduce the following three 
central functions. 
 The researcher’s utility or goal function 
 The salary function the researcher faces 
 The quality function; that is the relationship between the quality of the researcher’s 
research, skills and work effort 
 Some definition equations between time spent on different activities. 
The mathematical formulation of the model draws on previous work by Jørgensen and 
Wentzel-Larsen (1995). 
 
3.1 The researcher’s goal function  
Let us assume that a researcher’s utility (𝑈) is given by the following function2:  
 
(1) 𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑆, 𝐿, 𝑃, 𝑄) where 𝑈𝑆, 𝑈𝐿 , 𝑈𝑃, 𝑈𝑄 > 0, 𝑈𝑆𝑆, 𝑈𝐿𝐿 , 𝑈𝑃𝑃, 𝑈𝑄𝑄 ≤ 0 
  
In Eq. (1), 𝑆 represents the researcher’s total salary, 𝐿 his leisure time, 𝑃 his research production 
measured by the number of pages written, and finally, 𝑄 represents the quality of his written 
pages, for example, measured by the number of times his works are cited and their impacts on 
society in a broader sense (societal impacts), see for example, Hanssen and Jørgensen (2015)  
Bornmann (2017) and Hanssen et al. (2018). The higher the value of 𝑄, the higher his research 
quality. Furthermore, it is assumed that the utility function has the usual properties, i.e. it is 
strictly quasi-concave.3  
 
The reasons for including 𝑃 and 𝑄 as independent variables in the utility function are twofold. 
First, for purely altruistic and etic reasons or occupational pride, researchers find it satisfying 
to have a large research production of high quality, see for example Hesli and Lee (2013) and  
Swidler and Goldreyer (1998). Second, high 𝑃 and high 𝑄 can positively influence the 
                                                 
2 Here and throughout the article the notation 𝑌𝑋 means the partial derivative of Y with respect to X etc. 
3 A thorough discussion of quasi-concave functions can be found in Sydsæter and Hammond (2006). 
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reputation of a researcher (Petersen et al., 2014). Universities can also reward skilled 
researchers by providing better technical equipment, better access to research assistants, more 
travel funding, etc. The degree to which these rewards are used differs to some extent among 
universities. The relationships between 𝑈 and 𝑃 and between 𝑈 and 𝑄, therefore, will depend 
not only on the researcher, but also on the working conditions at the university where he is 
employed. When assuming 𝑈𝑃 = 𝑈𝑄 = 0, we are left with the “classical” optimisation problem, 
where the utility of the researcher is being determined by salary and leisure time alone. 
 
Because the number of pages written differs substantially across disciplines and between 
theoretical researchers and the more applied ones, one cannot use P as an indicator of 
researchers’ productivity without considering the type of research carried out. This is, for 
example, verified by Piro et al.(2013) and  Rørstad and Aksnes (2015) who used Norwegian 
data. When measuring publication output with the compound production measure (article 
equivalents) and fractionalising according to the number of total authors, researchers from the 
humanities and social sciences produced far more than their colleagues in natural science, 
medicine and technology.4 Hence, the influence of P on researchers’ utility will vary across 
fields and type of research. 
 
3.2 The salary function 
The salary (𝑆) of a researcher is defined by the following function: 
 
(2) 𝑆 = 𝑆(𝑃, 𝑄, 𝐸) where   𝑆𝑃, 𝑆𝑄 , 𝑆𝐸 > 0, 𝑆𝑃𝑃, 𝑆𝑄𝑄, 𝑆𝐸𝐸 ≤ 0 
 
in which 𝐸 is the time the researcher uses for external paid activities, such as consulting, 
directorships, etc. As emphasised earlier, universities throughout the world have introduced 
incentive schemes aiming to stimulate their academic staff to concentrate on publishing a large 
number of articles in well-recognised journals. This makes it reasonable to assume that 𝑆 
                                                 
4 It is reasonable to assume a positive monotonic relationship between the number of pages produced (P) and the 
number of article equivalent (AE). Note, that AE is not the same as the value of the publication indicator (PI)  
used in Norway. PI is a weighted average of the number of article equivalents using the journals’ impact factors 
as weights. Hence, the value of  PI depends on both P and Q. 
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increases non-convexly with 𝑃 and 𝑄. 5  Moreover, a partial increase in 𝐸 will increase 𝑆, 
because the researcher will choose the highest paid external activities first, 𝑆𝐸𝐸 < 0. 
 
It is reasonable to assume that an increase in the number of pages produced will have greater 
influence on salary if the quality of these pages is high, and vice versa. It is also likely that the 
prospect for a researcher to get highly paid external assignments improve if his research merits 
are good, mainly because this will make the researcher better known and his results more 
credible. Based on the above, it is thus reasonable to assume that the cross derivatives 
𝑆𝑃𝑄 , 𝑆𝐸𝑃, 𝑆𝐸𝑄 > 0.  
 
Salary normally increases with seniority. Moreover, older researchers have a larger network 
than the younger ones, making it easier for the former to obtain highly paid external activities. 
Consequently, for fixed values of 𝑃, 𝑄 and 𝐸, the value of 𝑆 is higher for seniors than for juniors. 
The shape of the 𝑆(𝑃, 𝑄, 𝐸) function will also vary between universities, due to the different 
possibilities of getting external engagements. All other things being equal, the value of 𝑆 is 
probably higher for university staff employed at reputable universities located in major cities 
than for their counterparts. 
 
The 𝑆(𝑃, 𝑄, 𝐸) function is of particular interest for the purpose of this article because the 
authorities can affect its shape by giving instructions or guidelines to the universities regarding 
how the academic staffs’ research merits should influence their salaries. Although the 
universities have some freedom to design their own wage-setting incentive schemes, the official 
guidelines are of great importance in all European countries, with Sweden and United Kingdom 
being the prime exceptions (Aghion et al., 2007).  
 
Consequently, the shape of the 𝑆(𝑃, 𝑄, 𝐸) function is an important instrument for designers of 
research policy. If, for example, the authorities want to put more weight on research quality,  
the (
𝑆𝑄
𝑆𝑃
) fraction will increase. An extreme case is when the universities focus most on research 
quantity, implying that (𝑆𝑄/𝑆𝑃) ≈ 0. In practice, this implies, broadly speaking, that the 
evaluation of an employee’s research merits is mostly based on how high a pile his scientific 
                                                 
5 The assumption made that the marginal influence on salary of increased research quality is non-increasing may 
be open to debate, but most universities (at least in Europe) have wage systems that limit large wage differentials 
among the staff.  
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production makes. Quite a few academic staffs all over the world claim that the above, 
unfortunately, applies for many incentive schemes at universities, as far as remunerating 
research merits are concerned. Also the increased focus on societal impacts of the research 
(Bornmann, 2017) is met by opposition by academics claiming that it will make researchers 
less free to follow their own interests, which will subsequently reduce the quality of research.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that while the choice of becoming a researcher is partly driven 
by pecuniary motives (Janger and Nowotny, 2016), it is a mistaken belief that pay incentives 
alone can create effective levels of motivation (de Lourdes Machado-Taylor et al., 2016). This 
could be one reason why performance related pay, often introduced as part of the management-
by-results doctrine, is probably not the best way of managing higher education institutions 
(Kallio and Kallio, 2014). The above arguments are the main reasons why we include P and Q 
as independent variables in the researcher’s goal function. 
 
3.3. The quality function  
The quality of the researcher’s publications is defined by the following function: 
 
(3) 𝑄 = 𝑄(𝑡, 𝑇, 𝐼)    𝑄𝑡, 𝑄𝑇 , 𝑄𝐼 > 0, 𝑄𝑡𝑡, 𝑄𝑇𝑇 , 𝑄𝐼𝐼 < 0 
  
in which 𝑡 is the average time used on each page of research produced, whereas 𝑇 represents 
the time the researcher uses to stay up to date in his or her field of research, i.e. to read relevant 
scientific literature, to attend  conferences, etc. The higher the values of 𝑡 and 𝑇, the more work 
is put into writing pages and the more updated he is on relevant research literature, respectively. 
Finally, 𝐼 is an index representing the general academic qualification of the researcher; the 
higher the value of 𝐼, the better his academic qualifications. The value of 𝐼 depends on his 
academic degree, his skills for research and, not  least,  the extent of deliberate practise or 
experience (Ericsson et al., 1993, Hanssen and Jørgensen, 2015). Our a priori assumptions, 
regarding the first and second derivatives, imply that the relationships between Q, on one hand, 
and 𝑡, 𝑇 and 𝐼, on the other hand, increase concavely; that is, the marginal effects on quality of 
increasing effort and qualification are diminishing. Further reasonable restrictions placed upon 
the quality function may be that 𝑄𝑡𝑇 , 𝑄𝑡𝐼 , 𝑄𝑇𝐼 > 0, meaning that the marginal effects of 
increasing efforts (higher values of t and T) are higher for skilled researchers than for the less 
skilled ones.  
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It is reasonable to assume that the marginal rate of substitution of research effort for skills 
diminishes rapidly.6 This is illustrated in Figure 1. The research quality along each curve (𝑄0, 𝑄1 
and 𝑄2) is constant, and 𝑄2 > 𝑄1 > 𝑄0. This implies that when 𝑄 = 𝑄𝑖 (𝑖 = 0, 1, 2), there are 
minimal substitution possibilities between skills and efforts on research quality when 𝐼 <
𝐼𝑖 (𝑖 = 0, 1, 2).  
 
 
Figure 1: Substitution possibilities between the researcher’s skills (𝐼) and work effort 
(𝑡 + 𝑇) for three different levels of research quality: 𝑄0, 𝑄1 and 𝑄2 . 
 
 
The shapes of the curves in Figure 1 will vary across disciplines, type of research and the 
researcher’s academic environment. Skills up to a certain level seem to play a significant role 
in academic performance across all disciplines, in particular for science subjects (see for 
example Furnham and Monsen, 2009, Hambrick and Meinz, 2011). This draws in the direction 
of slower curves in Figure 1 and higher threshold values of 𝐼𝑖 (𝑖 = 0, 1, 2) for researchers 
working in science fields. Moreover, it could be argued that for empirical studies whose quality 
critically depends on time-consuming and thorough work to obtain reliable data, hard work can, 
to a larger extent, compensate for skills. This means that the curves in Figure 1 become steeper 
and the dotted horizontal curves shift downwards.  
 
                                                 
6 (−
𝜕𝐼
𝜕𝑡
)
𝑄=𝑄∗
=
𝑄𝑡
´
𝑄𝐼
´   and/or (−
𝜕𝐼
𝜕𝑇
)
𝑄=𝑄∗
=
𝑄𝑇
´
𝑄𝐼
´  diminish rapidly. 
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Recent research also concludes that being part of a good research environment has a positive 
effect on researchers’ merits (Hanssen et al., 2018, Kenna and Berche, 2011). Azoulay et al. 
(2010) have for example identified a sizeable and permanent decline in the quality adjusted 
publication output for collaborators of eminent academic life scientists who die premature and 
unexpected. Consequently, for any given values of 𝑡, 𝑇 and 𝐼, 𝑄 should be higher for researchers 
working in large, solid research environments, than for those working in dull environments. 
This makes the curves in Figure 1 shift to the right and become steeper. The latter can be due 
to his research merits are probably less influenced by his own skills when working in a solid 
academic environment.  
 
Finally, we find it important to emphasise that we have made the tacit assumption that the 
researcher’s perception of the quality of his research in Eq. (3) coincides with the employer’s 
perception in the salary function Eq. (2). This is an important and reasonable assumption 
because both employees and employers currently evaluate the quality of written papers from 
the international rankings of the journals in which they are published.  
 
3.4 Definition equations 
The last two equations we introduce are the following: 
 
(4) 𝑅 = 𝑡 ∙ 𝑃 + 𝑇 
 
(5) 𝐿 = 𝐴 − 𝐷 − 𝑅 − 𝐸 
 
Eq. (4) states that the total time a researcher uses for research (𝑅) is the sum of time used for 
writing the papers (𝑡 ∙ 𝑃) and time used for reading relevant scientific literature (𝑇). In Eq. (5), 
𝐴 represents available time (approximately 24 ∙ 360 = 8649 hours per year) and 𝐷 is the time 
required for teaching, supervising and administrative duties. Consequently, Eq. (5) states that 
leisure time (𝐿) is the difference between available time (𝐴) and the amount of time spent 
working (𝐷 + 𝑅 + 𝐸).  
 
In the following, we regard the researcher’s time used for teaching and administrative duties 
(D) to be exogenous to him. In many countries, 𝐷 is decided by standard national rules for 
different academic positions. In Norway, for example, a professor, an associate professor and 
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an assistant professor spend, respectively, approximately 38, 35 and 36 hours per week on 𝐷 
(Egeland and Bergene, 2012). The amount of time universities’ academic staff must spend on 
teaching and administrative duties is regarded as an important research policy instrument. 
Lower (higher) values of 𝐷 will, in general, provide them with better (poorer) research 
opportunities, at least when it comes to teaching undergraduate students.7 It is, however, worth 
noting that teaching graduate students can drive research output, in particular when they are 
integrated in research activities (Horta et al., 2012). 
 
Finally. it is worth  mentioning that seeking research funding is considered an essential part of 
academic life (Ma et al., 2015), perhaps particularly in fields relying on costly experiments. A 
comparative study has, for example, found that astronomer’s submit more grant applications 
than psychologists (Von Hippel and Von Hippel, 2015). As university leaders to a greater extent 
than before express an expectation that academics should apply for external funding, innovation 
time spent on developing grant applications may be considered being a part of 𝐷.  
 
3.5 Interpretation of the first-order conditions for optimal behaviour 
Plugging Eqs. (2), (3), (4) and (5) in (1) gives 
 
(6) 𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑆(𝑃, 𝑄(𝑡, 𝑇, 𝐼), 𝐸), 𝐴 − 𝐷 − 𝑡 ∙ 𝑃 − 𝑇 − 𝐸, 𝑃, 𝑄(𝑡, 𝑇, 𝐼)) 
 
The 𝑃, 𝑡, 𝑇 and 𝐸 variables are controllable for the researcher. Thus, his problem is to find the 
values of these variables that maximise 𝑈 for given values of 𝐷 and 𝐼. After some mathematical 
computation, the first-order conditions for maximum 𝑈 can be written as  
 
(7) 
𝑄𝑡
𝑄𝑇
= 𝑃 
 
(8) 
𝑆𝑃
𝑆𝐸
+
𝑈𝑃
𝑈𝐿
= 𝑡 
 
(9) 
𝑆𝐸
𝑄𝑇
−
𝑈𝑄
𝑈𝑆
= 𝑆𝑄  
 
                                                 
7 In Norway, for example, general guidelines indicate that professors and associate professors should not use 
more than approximately 50% of their working time on teaching and administrative duties. Figures from Egeland 
and Bergene (2012) show, however, that these groups use only 30% of their total working time for research.   
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(10) 𝑈𝐿 = 𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝑆𝐸 
 
Assuming the second-order conditions for maximising 𝑈 are met8, Eqs. (7), (8), (9) and (10) 
determine how optimal values of 𝑃, 𝑄, 𝑡, 𝑇 and 𝐸 depend on the required time spent on teaching 
and administrative duties (𝐷) and the researcher’s academic ability (𝐼), that is 
 
(11) 𝑃∗ = 𝑃(𝐷, 𝐼),  𝑄∗ = 𝑃(𝐷, 𝐼), 𝑡∗ = 𝑡(𝐷, 𝐼), 𝑇∗ = 𝑇(𝐷, 𝐼), 𝐸∗ = 𝐸(𝐷, 𝐼) 
 
The definitional equations above then indirectly decide how much time the researcher uses for 
writing (𝑡∗ ∙ 𝑃∗), research activity in total  (𝑡∗ ∙ 𝑃∗ + 𝑇∗), paid external activities (𝐸∗), working 
(𝐷 + 𝑡∗ ∙ 𝑃∗ + 𝑇∗ + 𝐸∗) and leisure time (A - 𝐷 − 𝑡∗ ∙ 𝑃∗ − 𝑇∗ − 𝐸∗). 
 
Let us have a closer look at the first-order conditions: Eq. (7) implies that the marginal rate of 
substitution between 𝑇 and 𝑡 when 𝑄 = 𝑄∗ is equal to 𝑃.9 This means that the researcher will 
allocate his research time such that the last hour spent on research will provide the same 
improvement in research quality, no matter whether it is spent on written work or on reading 
relevant literature. It is worth noting that this condition applies for all 𝑈𝑆, 𝑈𝐿 , 𝑈𝑃, 𝑈𝑄 > 0 and 𝐼 
values, meaning that the condition does not depend on the shape of the researcher’s goal 
function or research abilities. This is reasonable because Eq. (7) shows how the researcher 
should allocate his time between different research activities (reading and writing). 
 
Eq. (8) states that in the optimum, the sum of the marginal rate of substitution between 𝐸 and 
𝑃 (when 𝑆 = 𝑆∗) and between 𝐿 and 𝑃 (when 𝑈 = 𝑈∗) equals the time spent writing each 
page.10 To interpret Eq. (8) further, it is useful to rephrase it by multiplying both sides by 
𝑆𝐸
𝑡
 . 
Then, we get 
  
(8∗) 
𝑈𝑃
𝑈𝐿
∙𝑆𝐸
𝑡
= 𝑆𝐸 −
𝑆𝑃
𝑡
 
 
                                                 
8 Based on our a priori assumptions about the functional forms, it is reasonable to assume that the second-order 
conditions are met. 
9 (−
𝜕𝑇
𝜕𝑡
)
𝑄=𝑄∗
=
𝑄𝑡
𝑄𝑇
 . 
10 (−
𝜕𝐸
𝜕𝑃
)
𝑆=𝑆∗
=
𝑆𝑃
𝑆𝐸
 , (−
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑃
)
𝑈=𝑈∗
=
𝑈𝑃
𝑈𝐿
 .  
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When the researcher’s utility is independent of the number of pages he writes  (𝑈𝑃 = 0), 𝑆𝐸 =
𝑆𝑃
𝑡
 according to (8*). This means that when maximising utility, the increase in salary of spending 
an extra hour on external activities (𝑆𝐸) equals the increase in salary of spending an extra hour 
on writing research (𝑆𝑃 𝑡⁄ ). However, if the researcher puts weight on research volume (i.e., 
𝑈𝑃 > 0), it follows from (8
∗) that  𝑆𝐸 >
𝑆𝑃
𝑡
  in the optimum, meaning that the increase in salary 
resulting from spending the last hour on paid external activities is greater than the increase in 
salary from spending it writing more pages. The researcher is therefore willing to take a salary 
reduction to have more pages of research written. If, for example, 𝑆𝐸=500 NOK/hour and 
𝑆𝑃
𝑡
 = 
400 NOK/hour, he is willing to pay NOK100 to spend an extra hour on writing rather than 
doing external activities.11 
 
Rephrasing Eq. (9) by multiplying both sides by (𝑄𝑇 ∙ 𝑈𝑆) gives 
 
(9∗)  𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝑆𝐸 = 𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝑆𝑄 ∙ 𝑄𝑇 + 𝑈𝑄 ∙ 𝑄𝑇   
 
In the optimum, the researcher’s increased utility due to the increased salary from spending one 
additional hour on paid external activities (𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝑆𝐸) is equal to the total increase in utility 
resulting from spending one additional hour reading relevant literature. The latter increase in 
utility is the sum of two components. First, (𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝑆𝑄 ∙ 𝑄𝑇) expresses the increase in utility 
caused by increased 𝑇, leading to higher quality research and, thereby, higher salary. Second, 
(𝑈𝑄 ∙ 𝑄𝑇) is the direct increase in utility due to higher research quality following reading an 
extra hour of relevant literature.  
 
In cases when 𝑈𝑄 > 0, it thus follows that 𝑆𝐸 > 𝑆𝑄 ∙ 𝑄𝑇 , meaning that the researcher is willing 
to reduce his salary to attain higher quality research. The marginal willingness to pay for reading 
research literature for one hour, rather than working one hour, on external paid activities is 
(𝑄𝑇 ∙ (−
𝜕𝑆
𝜕𝑄
)
𝑈=𝑈∗
.12 If, for example, 𝑆𝐸 = 500 NOK/hour and 𝑆𝑄 ∙ 𝑄𝑇 = 400 NOK/hour, the 
researcher is willing to take an NOK 100 salary reduction to spend the last hour reading relevant 
literature, instead of working on paid external activities. If the researcher does not experience 
                                                 
11 1 €≈ 9.5 𝑁𝑂𝐾. 
12 (−
𝜕𝑆
𝜕𝑄
)
𝑈=𝑈∗
=
𝑈𝑄
𝑈𝑆
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increased utility from improving the quality of his research alone, then  (𝑈𝑄 = 0), 𝑆𝐸 = 𝑆𝑄 ∙
𝑄𝑇. This means that in the optimum, reading an extra hour of relevant literature yields the same 
salary increase as working an extra hour on external activities.  
 
Finally, Eq. (10) states that in the optimum, the increase in utility from one hour more leisure 
time (𝑈𝐿) equals the increase in utility from spending one additional hour on paid external 
activities (𝑈𝑆 ∙ 𝑆𝐸). Note that Eq. (10) applies no matter the weight the researcher puts on his 
research merits alone (the values of 𝑈𝑃 and 𝑈𝑆) and his skills (𝐼).  
 
Before we leave the general model, we find it worthwhile to emphasise two things. First, in the 
case when the researcher’s utility does not depend on how well he is doing as a researcher 
(𝑈𝑃 = 𝑈𝑄 = 0), the first-order conditions express that the last hour spent working generates 
the same increase in salary no matter whether the researcher writes, reads actual literature or 
works on external paid activities. The researcher will thus allocate his working time to 
maximise his salary. In contrast, when 𝑈𝑃 , 𝑄𝑄 > 0, he will not allocate his working time to 
maximise salary, but will allocate more time on research at the expense of salary. Second, the 
researcher’s actual behaviour is based on his subjective beliefs regarding the shapes of the 
𝑆(𝑃, 𝑄, 𝐸) and 𝑄(𝑡, 𝑇, 𝐼) functions. The objective function (𝑄𝑂(𝑡, 𝑇, 𝐼)) (in particular) can 
differ substantially from the subjective one for inexperienced researchers. 
 
4 A closer specification of the actual functions  
4.1 Conditions for specification 
To discuss how the researcher’s behaviour or the optimal (chosen) values of 𝑃∗, 𝑡∗, 𝑇∗ and 𝐸∗ 
are influenced by required time spent on teaching duties (𝐷) and his skills (𝐼), the first-order 
conditions can be differentiated with respect to 𝐷 and 𝐼. The  
𝜕𝑍
𝜕𝑌
 (𝑍 = 𝑃∗, 𝑡∗, 𝑇∗, 𝐸∗, 𝑌 = 𝐷, 𝐼)  
derivatives, however, are complicated and, consequently, are difficult to interpret. Moreover, 
we want to discuss in more detail how the salary function facing the researcher influences his 
behaviour. For these reasons, we will specify the actual functions more precisely. 
 
Our choice of functional forms is based on the following considerations: First, the functions 
must be reasonable and thus, as far as possible, in accordance with the signs of the derivatives 
imposed on them in Section 3. Second, they must lead to manageable mathematical expressions 
for how skills (𝐼), required time spent on teaching duties (𝐷) and the salary function 
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(𝑆(𝑃, 𝑄, 𝐸)), influence the researcher’s behaviour, represented by the values of 𝑃∗, 𝑡∗, 𝑇∗ and 
𝐸∗.   
 
4.2. Chosen specification  
Based on the above, we introduce the following functions: 
 
(12) 𝑈 = 𝑈(𝐵) = 𝑈(𝛽1 ∙ 𝑆 + 𝛽2 ∙ ln𝐿 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑃 + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝑄),    𝑈𝐵 > 0,    𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, 𝛽4 > 0 
 
(13) 𝑆 = 𝜏0 + 𝜏1 ∙ 𝑃 + 𝜏2 ∙ 𝑄 + 𝜏3 ∙ 𝐸,    𝜏0, 𝜏1, 𝜏2, 𝜏3 > 0 
 
(14) 𝑄 = 𝛼0 ∙ 𝑡
𝛼1 ∙ 𝑇𝛼2 ∙ 𝐼𝛼3,    𝛼0 > 0,    0 < 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛼3 < 1 
 
It follows from Eq. (12) that if 𝑈𝐵𝐵 < 0 then 𝑈𝑆𝑆, 𝑈𝐿𝐿 , 𝑈𝑃𝑃, 𝑈𝑄𝑄 < 0.  In this case, the researcher 
has quasi-linear tastes because the marginal rates of substitution between leisure time, on one 
hand, and salary, number of pages published and their quality, on the other hand, only depend 
on leisure time, see for example, Nechyba (2011).13 When 𝑈𝐵𝐵 = 0, we will have 𝑈𝑆𝑆 = 𝑈𝑃𝑃 =
𝑈𝑄𝑄 = 0  and 𝑈𝐿𝐿 < 0. In this situation, the utility function will be additive and 𝐿 exhibits 
diminishing marginal utility while marginal utilities are constant for 𝑆, 𝑃 and 𝑄.  
 
The salary function in Eq. (13) does not fully satisfy all the requirements suggested in Section 
3. We tried out different specifications of it, such that either one, two or three of the cross 
derivatives (𝑆𝑃𝑄 , 𝑆𝐸𝑃 , 𝑆𝐸𝑄) are positive, without being able to find a tractable mathematical 
solution. However, it is easy to interpret; the authorities or employers can influence the salary 
of the researcher through the parameters 𝜏0, 𝜏1 and 𝜏2 in Eq. (13). A partial increase in 𝜏0 can 
be interpreted as a general increase in the researcher’s salary; thus, the researchers’ unions are 
particularly interested in increasing 𝜏0. If the authorities change the criteria for researchers’ 
salary and promotion in a way that makes the quality of the published work relatively more 
important than quantity, the proportion (
𝜏1
𝜏2
) will, according to Eq. (13), be reduced. The salary 
per hour from paid external activities in Eq. (12) is represented by 𝜏3. Eq. (13) implies that the 
value of 𝜏3 is considered independent from 𝑃 and Q, i.e. how good of a researcher he is. Note 
                                                 
13 
𝑈𝑆
𝑈𝑃
=
𝛽1
𝛽3
 , 
𝑈𝑆
𝑈𝑄
=
𝛽1
𝛽4
 , 
𝑈𝑃
𝑈𝑄
=
𝛽3
𝛽4
 ,
𝑈𝐿
𝑈𝑆
=
𝛽2
𝐿∙𝛽1
 
𝑈𝐿
𝑈𝑃
=
𝛽2
𝐿∙𝛽3
 , 
𝑈𝐿
𝑈𝑄
=
𝛽2
𝐿∙𝛽4
 . A thorough discussion of different types of utility 
functions can be found in Nechyba (2011).  
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that this does not mean that 𝜏3 is independent of researchers’ personal characteristics. There are 
many characteristics beyond research skills that can influence the potential for income from 
external activities; for example, the ability to communicate with potential clients and to promote 
his own expertise.  
 
Eq. (14) implies that 𝐸𝐿𝑡(𝑄) = 𝛼1, 𝐸𝐿𝑇(𝑄) = 𝛼2, 𝐸𝐿𝐼(𝑄) = 𝛼3, in which 𝐸𝐿𝑘(𝑄) denotes 
the elasticity of Q with respect to 𝑘 (𝑘 = 𝑡, 𝑇, 𝐼). Hence, when 0 < 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛼3 < 1, 𝑄 increases 
concavely with 𝑡, 𝑇 and 𝐼. Moreover, it is easy to verify that 𝑄𝑡𝑇 , 𝑄𝑡𝐼 , 𝑄𝑇𝐼 > 0 and thus, comply 
with earlier assumptions. A further interpretation of Eq. (14) is that low (high) values of  𝛼1 and 
𝛼2 (compared to 𝛼3) mean that hard work can, to a limited (high) extent, compensate for skills, 
in regard to producing research of high quality.14 Because active and stimulating working 
environments boost employees’ productivity, the value of 𝛼0 increases the more solid the 
academic community is where the researcher is employed.  
 
4.3 Model solutions 
Using Eqs. (7)–(10) in combination with Eqs. (12)–(14), gives, after some mathematical 
computation, the following expressions for the optimal values of 𝑃, 𝑡, 𝑇 and E: 
 
(15) 𝑃∗ = 𝑎 ∙ 𝐼𝑏 
 
(16) 𝑡∗ =
𝛽3+𝛽1∙𝜏1
𝛽1∙𝜏3
 
 
(17) 𝑇∗ =
𝛼2
𝛼1
∙ 𝑡∗ ∙ 𝑃∗ =
𝛼2
𝛼1
∙
𝛽3+𝛽1∙𝜏1
𝛽1∙𝜏3
∙  𝑎 ∙ 𝐼𝑏 
 
(18) 𝐸∗ = 𝐴 − 𝐷 −
𝛽2
𝛽1∙𝜏3
− 𝑡∗ ∙ 𝑃∗ ∙ (1 +
𝛼2
𝛼1
) =  𝐴 − 𝐷 −
𝛽2
𝛽1∙𝜏3
−
𝛽3+𝛽1∙𝜏1
𝛽1∙𝜏3
∙  𝑎 ∙ 𝐼𝑏 (1 +
𝛼2
𝛼1
) 
 
in which a = [
𝛼0∙𝛼1
1−𝛼2 ∙𝛼2
𝛼2 ∙(𝛽3+𝛽1∙𝜏1)
𝛼1+𝛼2 ∙(𝛽4+𝛽1∙𝜏2)
(𝛽1∙𝜏3)𝛼1+𝛼2
]
1
1−𝛼2
, 𝑏 =
𝛼3
1−𝛼2
. Our previous restrictions 
imposed on the 𝛼, 𝛽 and 𝜏 values imply that 𝑎, 𝑏 > 0.  
 
                                                 
14 Our specification of the quality function implies that the marginal rates of substitution between t, T and I are 
holding quality constant are 
𝜕𝑡
𝜕𝑇
= −
𝛼2
𝛼1
∙
𝑡
𝑇
 ,
𝜕𝑡
𝜕𝐼
= −
𝛼3
𝛼1
∙
𝑡
𝐼
 , 
𝜕𝑇
𝜕𝐼
= −
𝛼3
𝛼2
∙
𝑇
𝐼
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Using Eqs. (3), (4) and (5), the expressions for the researcher’s chosen values of leisure time 
(𝐿∗), the total time he chooses to spend on research (𝑅∗) and the chosen quality of the research 
produced (𝑄∗) can then be written as follows: 
 
(19) 𝐿∗ =
𝛽2
𝛽1∙𝜏3
 
 
(20) 𝑅∗ = 𝑡∗ ∙ 𝑃∗ ∙ (1 +
𝛼2
𝛼1
) =
𝛽3+𝛽1∙𝜏1
𝛽1∙𝜏3
∙  𝑎 ∙ 𝐼𝑏 ∙ (1 +
𝛼2
𝛼1
) 
 
(21) 𝑄∗ =
𝛽3+𝛽1∙𝜏1
𝛼1∙(𝛽4+𝛽1∙𝜏2)
∙ 𝑃∗ =  
𝛽3+𝛽1∙𝜏1
𝛼1∙(𝛽4+𝛽1∙𝜏2)
∙ 𝑎 ∙ 𝐼𝑏 
 
4.4 Further interpretation of the model’s results  
Eq. (17) shows that there is a proportional relationship between the amount of time the 
researcher spends reading relevant literature (𝑇∗) and writing (𝑃∗ ∙ 𝑡∗). This is valid independent 
of the parameters in the salary and utility functions, and for all positive transformations of the 
quality function. One should, therefore, be sceptical when a researcher claims he spends little 
time writing but much time reading. If that claim were true, he must believe that the (
𝛼2
𝛼1
) ratio 
is very high. From Eq. (19), it also follows that the researcher’s demand for leisure time (𝐿∗) 
only depends on how he values salary compared to leisure time (𝑡he values of 𝛽1 and 𝛽2) and 
the income possibilities from external paid work (𝜏3). Moreover, Eq. (21) shows a proportional 
relationship between the amount of research (𝑃∗) and its quality (𝑄∗), meaning that high quality 
research is likely produced by researchers publishing a lot of papers.  
 
Let us now discuss how actual research policy measures, represented by the parameters 
𝜏0, 𝜏1, 𝜏2  and 𝐷, influence the researcher’s behaviour.
15 This is an important discussion, not 
least because universities with high autonomy when it comes to wage setting and teaching 
duties to the staff seem to perform better than those with less such autonomy (Aghion et al., 
2007). Moreover, we will elaborate on how the researcher’s skills (𝐼) influence his behaviour 
and research merits. It is worth noting that the researcher’s fixed salary, represented by the 𝜏0, 
                                                 
15 The values of 𝜏0, 𝜏1, 𝜏2  and 𝐷 can, to some extent, vary among universities within the same country, but in 
many European countries, trade unions and central authorities can affect these figures, in particular 𝜏0. 
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does not influence the researcher’s behavior at all. A closer inspection of the equilibrium 
solutions above provides the basis for the following conclusions: 
 
The weight put on the number of pages published    
When the researcher’s salary becomes more dependent on research quantity, measured by the 
number of pages published (𝜏1 increases), the values of 𝑃
∗, 𝑡∗, 𝑇∗, 𝑄∗ and 𝑅∗ will increase, 
whereas the value of 𝐸∗ will decrease. It is easily seen from Eq. (19) that 𝐿∗ is not influenced 
by 𝜏1. This means that the increase in total time spent on research (𝑅
∗) is equal to the reduced 
time spent on external activities (𝐸∗). Our model formulation implies that when more emphasis 
is placed on quantity, it will increase the quality of research as well (𝑄∗ increases). 
 
The weight put on research quality    
More emphasis placed on research quality (increasing 𝜏2) will influence 𝑃
∗, 𝑇∗, 𝑄∗ and 𝑅∗ in 
the same direction as an increase in 𝜏1; the researcher will publish more pages of higher quality 
and, consequently, spend more time doing research. Because his demand for leisure time in this 
case is also independent of 𝜏2, the increase in total research time equals the reduction in time 
spent on external activities. Contrary to the case when 𝜏1 increases, it follows from Eq. (15) 
that the time the researcher spends on each page published (𝑡∗) is independent of the weight 
the regulators put on research quality; increasing 𝜏2 increases quality only through more time 
spent on reading relevant literature (𝑇∗). 
 
Teaching and administrative duties  
Higher requirements from the employer regarding teaching and administrative duties 
(increasing 𝐷) will decrease the researcher’s time spent on external activities accordingly, see 
Eq. (18). Small changes in such working conditions, thus, will influence neither the quantity 
nor the quality of his research.  
 
The researcher’s skills 
Neither the time spent on each page written (𝑡∗), nor the researcher’s demand for leisure time 
(𝐿∗), are influenced by his skills (𝐼). More skilled researchers will, however, spend less time 
on paid external activities (𝐸∗). Taking into consideration the model specifications, this result 
is reasonable. When the potential to earn money from external activities (according to Eq. (13)) 
is not influenced by the researcher’s skills, whereas the improvement in quality from spending 
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more time per page written and from reading relevant literature is greater the more skilled he 
is, he will spend more working hours on research than will his less skilled counterparts.  
 
Based on the expressions above, it can be found that 𝐸𝑙𝐼𝑃
∗ = 𝐸𝑙𝐼𝑇
∗ = 𝐸𝑙𝐼𝑅
∗ = 𝐸𝑙𝐼𝑄
∗ = 𝑏, 
where 𝐸𝐿𝐼(𝑞) denotes elasticity of 𝑞 (𝑞 =  𝑃
∗, 𝑇∗, 𝑅∗, 𝑄∗) with respect to 𝐼. Because 𝑏 > 0, 
more skilled researchers will write more pages of higher quality and spend more time reading 
relevant literature and on research in general. From the definition of 𝑏 in Eq. (18), it also follows 
that 
 
    𝑏 increases with 𝛼2 and 𝛼3.  This means that the more influenced the quality of research 
is by the researcher’s skills and the time spent reading relevant literature, the more the 
𝑃∗, 𝑇∗, 𝑅∗ and 𝑄∗ values are influenced by 𝐼, relatively speaking.  
 
    𝑏 > 𝛼3. This means that there are mechanisms via the researcher’s behaviour that make 
the research quality vary more, relatively speaking, with skills (I) than the quality 
function indicates. It comes from more skilled researchers spending more time reading 
relevant literature than less skilled researchers. 
 
    When 𝛼3 > 1 − 𝛼2, it follows that 𝑏 > 1. The more the quality of research is influenced 
by the researcher’s skills and the time he uses for reading relevant literature, the more 
likely it is that 𝑃∗, 𝑇∗, 𝑄∗ and 𝑅∗ increase convexly with 𝐼. 
 
 
Influencing the researcher’s utility function 
The parameters 𝜏0, 𝜏1, 𝜏2  and 𝐷 (above) are directly controllable for universities and/or 
authorities. Indirectly, however, they can influence researchers’ behaviour through campaigns 
focusing on increasing their work ethic and intrinsic motivation16; that is increasing the values 
of 𝛽3 and 𝛽4 in Eq. (12). It is easy to confirm from the equilibrium solutions above that this will 
cause more and better research, due to more time spent on research at the expense of external 
paid work.  
 
                                                 
16 The interrelationships between the effects on work effort of intrinsic motivation and external payment schemes 
is discussed in Grepperud and Pedersen (2006).  
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In the special case where the researcher only cares about salary and leisure time (𝛽3 = 𝛽4 = 0), 
all expressions above (except Eq. (19)) will become less complicated. The relative changes in 
𝑃∗, 𝑇∗, 𝑅∗ and 𝑄∗ when 𝐼 changes by one percentage point (𝑏 value) are, however, unchanged. 
In particular, it is worth noting that the expression in Eq. (16) for optimum work effort per page 
written can be reduced to 𝑡∗ =
𝜏1
𝜏3
. This implies that the researcher would allocate his working 
hours to maximise his salary. As a result, the time spent on each page written will be similar to 
the ratio of increased salary from writing one additional page (𝜏1), to increased salary from 
working one additional hour on paid external activities (𝜏3). 
 
The model’s results seen in the light of the internationalization of research   
Even though some cultural, political and language barriers still exist in the research community, 
higher education and research activities have become increasingly internationalized. This has 
led to extensive ranking of universities worldwide which, in turn, influences their attractiveness 
to researchers and students (Delgado et al., 2013, Elken et al., 2016). In this respect, our model 
has both strengths and weaknesses. Its strength is its focus on how attractive a workplace is for 
researchers, dependend on their level of utility (U); they enjoy working there. The shape of the 
utility function varies individually depending on the weights placed on salary, leisure time and 
achieved research merits.  
 
The fact that research merits (P and Q) are independent arguments in the researcher’s goal 
function means that an institution’s academic reputation is important when academics decide 
where they want to work. A number of studies confirm  that working in solid academic 
departments enhance an individual’s research achievements and, thereby, their utility, see for 
example Stankiewicz (1979), Kenna and Berche (2011), and Hanssen and Jørgensen (2018). 
Moreover, our model results imply that every researcher’s utility increases with salary and the 
potential for external income and decreases with teaching duties. These factors are to some 
extent controllable for national governments and for each institution. Summing up, the model 
reveals that many factors beyond salary affect where researchers want to work. The weight 
researchers put on doing good research, compared to salary and leisure time, decide to what 
extent academic reputation and solid working environments can compensate for low salary and 
long working days.  
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Another implication of increased globalisation of research is that it causes higher academic 
mobility (Kim, 2017) and higher turnover of university staff. This makes it harder for each 
university to influence the employees’ attitudes or shape their utility functions (in particular the 
𝛽3 and 𝛽4 parameters in Eq. (12)). In this way, internationalization of research causes fewer 
possibilities for the universities to influence the attitudes and behaviour of their staff. 
 
The increased mobility of academic staff due to internationalization leads to the transformation 
of the model’s results on individual behaviour to long-term institutional and national research 
performance should be done with caution. The model concludes, for example, that heavier 
teaching duties (increasing D) will only affect researchers’ time spent on external activities, (E) 
whilst an increase in fixed salary (𝜏0) will not affect their behaviour at all. These conclusions 
can only apply to the institutional level over a very short period of time and/or when the staff’s 
mobility is almost absent. Institutions offering heavy teaching duties and low salaries will, 
according to our modelling, reduce researchers’ utility and, subsequently, attract less competent 
researchers, those with lower skills (I). Thus, employers who embark on such a strategy will be 
outperformed in a global market. The last statements gain support from Aghion et al. (2007) 
(2007) and Aghion et al. (2010) in their comprehensive analyses of universities’ performance 
in Europe and the US. Affluent and autonomous universities having the opportunity to spend a 
lot of money on teaching (resulting in low D) and on good and flexible wage schemes 
(𝜏0, 𝜏1 and  𝜏2  are controllable)  perform highest. 
 
5. Concluding remarks  
This paper first briefly reviews the worldwide development of the university sector, the use of 
reward systems for university employees and the measurement of research output. It concludes 
that new public management thinking has resulted in more focus on quantitative research 
measures and external incentives, leading to a significant increase in the number of published 
articles. Then, it presents a model that describes the behaviour of a researcher characterised by 
the time spent on activities such as writing research papers, reading relevant literature and paid 
external work. The model also estimates the researcher’s demand for leisure time and, thereby, 
the total time spent working. In our model, the behaviour of a researcher depends on the 
following: 
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 The researcher’s utility function. It is assumed that the researcher’s utility is influenced 
by salary, leisure time and research achievements. 
 The researcher’s skills. 
 The quality function, that is, the researcher’s perception of how the quality of the written 
scientific production is influenced by the work effort put into each page written, time 
spent reading relevant literature and his own skills.  
 The salary function, that is, how the researcher’s salary is influenced by the number of 
pages written, the quality of the research and the time used for external paid activities.  
 The time the researcher is required to teach, supervise and perform administrative duties. 
 
The last two points are controllable for employers, central authorities and trade unions and, as 
such, are relevant research policy measures. Researchers’ utility functions can be indirectly 
influenced by the same groups through campaigns giving research achievements higher status.  
 
The general model set up in Section 3 and the first-order conditions for maximising the 
researcher’s utility give rise to a number of interesting interpretations. In the optimum, the 
researcher will allocate his total research time (𝑅∗) such that the last hour spent on his written 
work (𝑡∗ ∙ 𝑃∗) should yield the same improvement in research quality (𝑄∗) as spending the last 
hour reading relevant literature (𝑇∗). Moreover, the increase in his utility from one hour more 
of leisure time (𝐿∗) equals the increase in utility following from spending one additional hour 
on paid external activities (𝐸∗). These two conclusions hold irrespective of the shape of the 
researcher’s goal function (𝑈(𝑆, 𝐿, 𝑃, 𝑄)) and his skills (𝐼). 
 
By introducing special but reasonable functions in Section 4, we have found that changing the 
basic salary (𝜏0) will not influence the researcher’s behavior and, thereby, the quantity (𝑃
∗) 
and quality of his research(𝑄∗). More weight placed on research quantity (increasing 𝜏1) and 
on research quality (increasing 𝜏2) will increase both the amount of research and its quality, 
due to researchers spending more time on research work (𝑅∗) at the expense of doing external 
paid work (𝐸∗). The total amount of leisure time (𝐿∗) and, consequently, working hours (𝑅∗ +
𝐸∗ + 𝐷) will be unchanged. Furthermore, the model shows that a slightly higher requirement 
concerning teaching and administrative duties (increasing 𝐷) will influence neither the quality 
of research nor the demand for leisure time; such an increase will only lead to the researcher 
spending less time doing external paid work. Finally, the model reveals skilled researchers (with 
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high I) will spend more time on research and, consequently, produce more pages of higher 
quality research than their less skilled colleagues. Total work time is independent of the 
researchers’ skills, meaning that increased time used for research activities exactly outweighs 
reduced time spent on external paid work.  
 
Taking the model formulation and its results as starting points, we can make several policy 
implications. First, increasing the weight placed on research quantity will increase its quality 
and vice versa; the model solutions imply a proportional relationship between quality and 
quantity. Thus, the most important thing to improve research performance is that employers 
appreciate research and not weather they focus on quality or quantity. This is supported by 
studies finding a positive correlation between researchers number of papers and number of 
citations (Sandström and van den Besselaar, 2016), and that the higher number of papers a 
researcher publishes, the higher the proportion of these papers are among the most cited 
(Larivière and Costas, 2016). Second, when adjusting for applicants’ age, scientific field and 
type of research (theoretical or empirical), the number of pages written (research quantity) 
signals their skills, research effort and research achievements. Hence, applicants for academic 
positions who have done the same types of research could be ranked according to the number 
of written pages. This measure of research activity is easy to operationalize, making the 
evaluation work much easier for universities and, thereby, saving them from costly and time-
consuming evaluations procedures. Third, the model confirms that skilled researchers with 
good research records want to spend less time doing external paid work, implying that 
promoting such possibilities has less impact on the most able researchers than for their 
counterparts. Massive advertising of good external income possibilities may, thus, be 
counterproductive because it will attract the least skilled researchers. Fourth, the model reveals 
that every employer has ways to influence employees’ utility and, thereby, the attractiveness of 
the workplace. Because employees’ goal functions differ, it is sensible to make individual salary 
agreements and teaching schemes to maximise overall satisfaction.  
 
The above discussion reveals the strength of our model. Its mathematical formulation enables 
us to discuss in a consistent way how actual means for authorities and employers to boost 
research, either through the salary schemes (the values of 𝜏0, 𝜏2 and 𝜏3), through creating an 
academic environment that encourages research (the values of 𝛽3 and 𝛽4), and through offering 
employees easy teaching duties (the value of D). Additionally, the model focuses on the 
importance of being competitive in order to attract clever researchers (the value of I).  The 
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model is thus an important supplement to all the empirical studies referred to herein, because it 
reveals the interrelationships between research policy instruments on one hand and researchers’ 
behaviour and subsequently research outcome on the other hand.  
 
Despite the model’s stringency, we find it important to emphasise its most prominent 
weaknesses   when using it for policymaking. Ranking researchers’ skills by the number of 
pages they have written requires that they assess their own skills correctly. If their abilities to 
assess their own skills vary considerably, the number of pages written per unit of time can send 
a wrong signal with regard to their skills. Inexperienced researchers will, as mentioned earlier, 
probably be less able to evaluate their skills than the more experienced ones, making this 
method particularly unreliable for evaluating inexperienced researchers. Second, the number of 
pages written (P) will, according to our model, depend on the degree to which the workplaces 
where the researcher has worked have stimulated research (the values of 𝛽3 and 𝛽4). There are 
also indications that being associated with post-doctoral fellows or doctoral students, for 
example as supervisors, can positively influence the value of 𝑃. In “fast-moving” research, 
characterised by rapid cumulative progress through many publications with short intervals, 
postdoctoral fellows appear to be more prevalent (Igami et al., 2015). A study of peer reviewed 
publications by all doctoral students in Quebec also found that young scholars contribute to a 
considerable proportion of new knowledge created (Larivière, 2012). All else being equal, the 
numbers of pages produced will, thus, overestimate the skills of researchers who have been 
members of solid working environments, compared to researchers who have worked in less 
stimulating ones. Third, social ties between researchers and editors of journals can influence 
our measures of research production (P) and its quality (Q). A recent study by Colussi (2017) 
found that during an editor’s appointment, his or her former graduate students can expect an 
increase in the number of articles published by 15%. Moreover, articles by former graduate 
students of an editor receive on average 6.7 more citations when this editor is in charge. The 
performance of researchers with such ties will, thus, be overstated. Lastly, as emphasised 
earlier, one has to adjust for the applicant’s age, the subject area and the kind of research carried 
out.  
 
It is also important to note that our model is a static one and shows the individual short-term 
effects of different policy measures. The long-term effects at an institutional and national level 
could be different, as far as research performance is concerned. Our model shows, for example, 
that a general increase in salary independent of the researcher’s merits and less heavy teaching 
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duties are poor instruments for boosting individual research. In the long-run, however, a higher 
fixed salary and fewer teaching duties will increase all researchers’ utility and, thereby, make 
the workplace more attractive. This will, in turn, attract more good scientists who, according to 
our model, perform better and improve the academic environment. For universities in small 
countries, it is particularly important to offer a combination of salary, leisure time, teaching 
duties and academic environment that make them attractive (provide high U) to the international 
community of researchers.  
 
Despite the above-mentioned limitations, the paper has nevertheless presented a model that 
provides a realistic description of a researcher’s behaviour and, thus, is useful for universities, 
trade unions and politicians dealing with research issues. The increased focus on different 
reward schemes to boost research in many countries makes the model particularly relevant now; 
as long as the chosen specifications of the actual functions in Section 4 are reasonable, their 
outcomes will be too. It is also worth noting that over a short period, it is likely that neither the 
composition of the workforce at universities nor its working conditions will change much. This 
supports the relevance of our model.  
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